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  We consider data from 16 Asian countries, 16 European countries and the US to 
investigate the relationship between venture capital and corporate governance.  There are five 
main findings.   First, the variable measuring law and order is negatively related to the 
importance of venture capital finance.  Second, the allocation of investment across different 
stages and different industries depends more on macroeconomic factors than on corporate 
governance variables.  Third, in Low-GDP countries the allocation of venture capital is greater 
for low technology industries than for high technology industries.   Fourth, venture capital 
boomed and became significant in many countries during the stock market boom or “bubble” of 
the late 1990’s.  Finally, a comparison of Asian and European venture capital shows that in Asia 
there was more investment in early stage projects while in Europe there was more investment in 
late stage projects.  Also, in Europe there was more investment in medical and biotechnology 
industries. 
  1 
1.   Introduction 
In the US venture capital has been particularly important in many new industries at the 
initial stage.   It accounts for about two-thirds of the private-sector external equity financing of 
high-technology firms.
1  Venture capital differs from standard forms of financing in that there is 
much more involvement of providers of funds than is the case with other forms of lending such 
as bank loans in an attempt to avoid the problems arising from asymmetric information.  Lenders 
are also concerned about resolving the uncertainty of cash flows.  The absence of collateral 
means they cannot simply leave the entrepreneurs to their own devices, they must ensure 
resources are not squandered to try and earn a return on their investment.  They provide finance 
in stages to ensure that option value is maximized.  As Kaplan and Stromberg (2002) have 
documented these characteristics of venture capital mean that the contractual arrangements for 
venture capital are much more complex than for most types of finance.  Typically they involve 
both sides receiving part of the upside potential of the project, in other words they have equity-
type characteristics.  
Venture capitalists typically provide finance for a limited period of time.  If a firm is 
successful its needs for capital rapidly outstrip the capacity of limited partnerships that are the 
usual providers of venture capital in the US.  An important exit mechanism for venture capitalists 
is an initial public offering (IPO) of the company.  Even though IPO’s are costly in a number of 
ways they often represent the best means for initial investors to obtain a return.  Another 
common exit mechanism is outright sale of the start-up to a large firm. 
The venture capital industry has prospered most in the US and the vast majority of the 
academic literature has been concerned with the US.  In a cross-country study of venture capital, 
Jeng and Wells (2000) using data from 1986-1995 for 21 countries document that venture capital 
                                                 
1 See Freear and Wetzel (1994).  2 
is less important in other countries.  Their main finding is that the existence of an active IPO 
market is the most important determinant of the importance of venture capital in a country.  This 
consistent with the finding of Black and Gilson (1998) in a comparison of the US and Germany, 
that the primary reason venture capital is relatively successful in the US is the active IPO market 
that exists there.   
  As Section 2 documents it took some time before a widely used contractual and 
institutional framework for venture capital became established in the US.  This together with the 
complexity of the contract forms and the staging of finance suggests that corporate governance is 
a crucial component of venture capital.  In this paper we consider the relationship between 
venture capital and corporate governance using data on venture capital from 33 countries during 
the 1990’s.  Whereas Jeng and Wells (2000) included only 4 Asian countries, our data set 
includes 16.  The data we use to measure corporate governance come from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Our main findings are as follows. 
  First, corporate governance plays a different role than in the public equity and bond 
markets.  The variable measuring law and order is negatively related to the importance of venture 
capital finance.  In other words, countries with less law and order have a higher degree of 
venture capital.  This is in marked contrast to the findings of La Porta et al. (1997) with regard to 
the public markets where the opposite relationship holds.  This indicates that explicit contracts 
are not as important as the conventional wisdom suggests.  In fact implicit relationships appear to 
provide a good substitute and this allows venture capital to fill the gap for the public markets.  
More in line with conventional wisdom, creditor rights are significant in determining the amount 
of venture capital in the market.  3 
  Second, the allocation of investment across different stages of finance and different 
industries depends more on macroeconomic factors than on corporate governance variables.  
  Third, in Low-GDP countries venture capital is more important for low technology 
industries than for high technology industries.   
  Fourth, venture capital boomed and became significant in many countries during the 
stock market boom or “bubble” of the late 1990’s. 
  Finally, a comparison of Asian and European venture capital shows that in Asia there was 
more investment in early stage projects while in Europe there was more investment in late stage 
projects.  Also, in Europe there was more investment in medical and biotechnology industries. 
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we document the way in 
which venture capital developed and operates in the US.  Section 3 describes the data and 
variables we use and Section 4 investigates the role of corporate governance in determining the 
importance of venture capital across countries.    Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Venture Capital in the US 
Many high technology companies in the US have initially been funded with venture 
capital.
2  Although venture capital has been used for over 50 years it is only in the last 20 years 
or so that it has become a significant source of funds for new companies.  American Research 
and Development (ARD), which was founded in 1946, was the first modern U.S. venture capital 
firm.  It was a publicly traded, closed-end investment company.  Initially, ARD was not 
particularly successful.  It did not attract institutional investors in the way that its founders had 
hoped.  Eventually it was profitable but not spectacularly so, providing investors with a 15.8 
percent annual return over its 25 years as an independent firm compared to 12.8 percent on the 
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Dow Jones over the same period.  A large proportion of this return came from a $70,000 
investment in Digital Equipment Corporation, without it the return to investors would have been 
only 7.4 percent. 
Private venture capital companies were established to manage the investments of wealthy 
individuals but because of ARD’s lack of success there were no publicly traded venture capital 
firms founded until Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) were established under the 
Small Business Investment Act of 1958.  These are tax-advantaged corporations licensed by the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) to provide professionally managed capital to risky 
companies.  One of the main advantages that SBICs had was access to low-cost SBA loans.  The 
SBIC program suffered from a number of difficulties including a lack of institutional investors, 
and investment managers that were not the most talented.  Despite these problems SBICs did 
succeed in channeling many more funds to start-up companies than ARD. 
In the late 1970’s there were a number of important changes that allowed venture capital 
to start growing dramatically.  The first was a change in the Labor Department’s interpretation of 
the “prudent man” provision of ERISA.  This had traditionally been interpreted as ruling out 
investments in new companies or venture capital funds.  However, in 1978 a proposal was made 
to allow such investments provided the entire portfolio was not endangered and this was adopted 
the following year.   
The second was the reduction in maximum capital gains tax rates from 49.5 percent to 28 
percent in 1978 and to 20 percent in 1981. 
The third important change was the start of the widespread use of limited partnerships as 
the investment form.  Prior to the 1980s only a small fraction of venture capital investments were  5 
structured in this way.  During the 1980s and 1990s, however, over 80 percent of the capital 
committed to venture capital was in this form. 
The limited partnership form has a number of advantages.  The partnership’s income is 
not subject to the corporate income tax.  When a partnership distributes securities these are not 
taxed until they are sold.  To qualify for these and other advantages several conditions must be 
met. 
1.  A fund’s life must have a predetermined finite lifetime. 
2.  The transfer of limited partnership units is restricted so they cannot be easily bought 
and sold. 
3.  It is not possible to withdraw from the partnership before the termination date.   
4.  In order to preserve their limited liability, limited partners cannot participate in the 
day-to-day management of the fund. 
The typical life of funds is ten years with extensions of from one to three years allowed.  The 
fourth limitation means that the venture capitalists that run the fund are general partners and bear 
unlimited liability.  However, the funds usually do not borrow or engage in activities that expose 
them to large liabilities so this is not an important restriction. 
  An important aspect of venture capital contracts is the way in which the venture 
capitalists are compensated.  There are typically two components to this, a fixed fee and share of 
the profits.  The fixed component is usually between 1.5 percent and 3 percent of net asset value 
and the other component is around 20 percent of profits. 
  Venture capital investment involves a number of stages.
3 Venture capitalists may provide 
funds for all or some of these stages.  The basic document governing the relationship between 
the venture capital firm and the company they are investing in is the stock-purchase agreement.  
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This specifies the amount and timing of the investment in the company.  Usually, the amount 
invested grows through time.  At each stage the amount invested is expected to carry the firm 
through until the next stage.  By staging the financing in this way the venture capitalists can 
maximize the option value of the investment by making sure the correct continuation decision is 
made. 
  The form of security that is usually used in venture capital investments is convertible 
preferred stock.  The important parameters for these are: 
a.  the conversion price which can be contingent on firm performance; 
b.  liquidation preferences including a description of the events that trigger liquidation; 
c.  dividend rate, payment terms, and voting rights (typically on an as-if-converted basis). 
The convertible preferred typically does not pay a dividend on a current basis, but at the 
discretion of the board of directors.  Sometimes the dividends accrue and are not paid in cash but 
the liquidation preference entitles the holders to the face value and the accrued dividends. 
  The agreements between venture capitalists and the firm typically have a number of other 
components.  Venture capitalists can usually call for the redemption of the preferred stock.  They 
also often have preemptive rights and rights of first refusal if new stock is issued.   Key 
employees are often required to execute employment contracts with noncompete clauses.  
Employees in startups accept low salaries in return for some kind of equity interest and the 
vesting of shares is often laid out in the agreements.  Finally, the agreements usually specify 
extensive access to information such as monthly financial statements, frequent operating 
statements and the right to inspect at will. 
  The evidence in this section suggests that venture capital requires a quite specific 
contractual and institutional framework to become a significant means of funding.  The  7 
complexity of the contractual forms and the role of stage financing also suggest that corporate 
governance is an important factor in venture capital, at least in the US.  We next go on to 
consider the importance of corporate governance in other countries. 
 
3.  Data and Variables 
3.1. Sample  selection 
  Venture capital information on 33 countries during the decade of the 1990s are obtained 
from the 2001 Yearbook of National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) for the US, The 2002 
Guide to Venture Capital in Asia (AVCJ) for Asian countries, and various Yearbooks of 
European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) for European countries.
4  
Because the focus of this paper is on the relationship between corporate governance and venture 
capital, we use the list of countries in La Porta et al (1998), which provide governance 
information on 49 countries, as the starting point.  We then match this list with venture capital 
information available to us.  This screening produces a sample contains 32 countries.  We add 
China and obtain governance information from Allen, Qian and Qian (2002).  All other macro 
indicators were downloaded from the World Bank online database except Taiwan, which is 
obtained from the National Statistics Bureau of Executive Yuan of the Republic of China.  Legal 
origin information for each country is also obtained from La Porta et al (1998).  China is not 
classified based on legal origin. 
Because of information availability, we left out Canada and all South American and 
African countries.  Among these countries, only Canada has average real GDP per capita 
(measured in constant 1995 US$) above US$10,000 during the 1990s.  The remainder all have 
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GDP per capital less than US$10,000.  They are likely to have fewer venture capital activities 
compared to more developed countries.  Although many developing countries are left out in our 
study, we still retain 8 developing countries in Asia in our sample, which we classified as the 
Low-GDP group.  Among the remaining countries, 12 having GDP per capital above US$25,000 
are defined as the High-GDP group, which contains US, Japan, and 10 European countries.  The 
rest of the 13 countries are the Mid-GDP group that includes some European countries, Israel, 
New Zealand, Australia, and the 4 newly industrialized “little dragons” in Asia, i.e., Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.      
 
3.2.  Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
There is no standardized format of reporting information among the three trade 
associations, i.e., AVCJ, EVCA, and NVCA.  Therefore, a detailed description of variable 
definition is necessary to ensure consistency and to facilitate interpretation of the results.  Three 
proxies are employed to examine the level of venture capital activities.  They are venture capital 
investment portfolio (VCIP), annual new fund raised, and total annual disbursements.
5  Most of 
the countries have information on VCIP from 1993 to 2000, the information on the remaining 
two variables are available from 1994 to 2000.  We also examine the growth rates of venture 
capital activities.  However, none of the independent variables in this study could explain the 
growth rates across countries, thus, we do not report the results. 
VCIP for Asian countries is the cumulative total of existing investments less any 
divestments made as defined by AVCJ.  That for European countries is the “Portfolio at Cost” on 
December 31 reported by EVCA.  NVCA does not report VCIP, thus, “Capital Under 
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Management” is used as the proxy for VCIP for the United States.  Note that capital under 
management includes total capital available for investment plus cumulative investment portfolio 
currently held.  As will be discussed later, the venture capital information from NVCA is not 
directly comparable to that from the other two trade associations in many ways.  In addition, 
economically, the venture capital industry in the US has a much longer history and is more 
developed than others.  As a robustness check, all the analyses were repeated without US data.  
The findings are essentially unchanged and thus are not reported. 
Table 1 reports VCIP in 1993 and 2000 in two measures, i.e., in constant 1995 US$ in 
millions and as a percentage of GDP.  Geometric average growth rates for both measures during 
this period are also reported.  The last column shows the average real GDP per capita in 1995 
US$ during 1991 to 2000, which is used to classify country’s economic development into High-
GDP, Mid-GDP, and Low-GDP group.  From Panels A and B of Table 1, one can see that most 
of the Asian countries started with few venture capital activities in 1993 but European countries 
had higher levels in place.  However, both regions grew dramatically during the 1990s with an 
average growth rate of 33% for Asia and that of 24% for Europe (Column 6 of Panel D, %GDP 
based).  These two numbers are insignificantly different due to big variation among countries in 
each region.  The average growth rate for US is also 24%. 
  In general, the growth rates of venture capital do not differ among groups with different 
GDP per capita, but the levels of venture capital differ, in particular, when the level is 
standardized by GDP regardless of time period.  The Mid-GDP group has the highest level of 
venture capital (as % of GDP), followed by the High-GDP group, then the Low-GDP group.  In 
terms of dollar measure (constant 1995 US$), there is no difference between the High-GDP and 
the Mid-GDP groups in both 1993 and 2000.  The Mid-GDP group has marginally significant  10 
higher VCIP in dollar measure than the Low-GDP group in both 1993 and 2000.  There are little 
differences among legal origin subgroups. 
In Table 2 new funds raised are the total capital raised during 2000 and are given as a 
percentage of GDP.  Similarly, total annual disbursements are the amounts invested in portfolio 
companies.  For Asian and European countries, the numbers include both venture capital and 
buyouts.  Although the figures of Asia are larger than those of Europe, these numbers are not 
significantly different.  For US, only venture capital is included because NVCA reports 
allocation information based on capital committed to venture capital.  The venture capital funds 
raised in US are $92.9 billion in 2000.  Including the capital committed to buyouts, mezzanine, 
and other private capital, total private equity capital in US summed to $167.65 billion in 2000, 
which is a huge number compared to that of any other country in 2000.  Both the High- and Mid-
GDP groups raise (invest) significantly larger amounts of funds than the Low-GDP group in 
2000.  In general, there is little difference between groups with different legal origins.  Most of 
the differences are not significant and those that are significant are only significant at the 10% 
level for a one-tailed test. 
Figures 1 and 2 provide the time series information on new funds raised as a percentage 
of GDP each year from 1994 to 2000 by region and by GDP per capita level, respectively.  It can 
be seen from Figure 1 that the US has a higher level of new funds raised near the end of the 
1990s compared to the average figures for Asia and Europe.  Before 1997, there are few 
differences among different regions.  However, after 1997, venture capital activities pick up in 
all regions with different levels.  Figure 2 demonstrates similar trends.  Since 1997, the Mid-
GDP group has the highest new funds raised as a percentage of GDP, followed by the High-GDP 
group, then by the Low GDP group.     11 
Table 2 also reports the funding sources and allocations (uses) of funds in 2000 by 
region.  Same region indicates the percentage of funds raised (sources) or disbursements (uses) 
in the same continent but outside the home country.  Outside region indicates outside the home 
continent.  The last 6 columns (% sources and uses) do not contain US data because the NVCA 
only provides US domestic activities.  Thus, we do not have information on foreign funding 
sources and investments for the US. 
Europe tends to have a higher percentage of funds provided by domestic investors, but 
Asia has a higher percentage of funds come from outside the continent.  There is no difference in 
disbursements in region between Asia and Europe.  In terms of funding sources, the High-GDP 
group has the highest percentage provided by domestic investors, followed by the Mid-GDP 
group.  The Low-GDP group has the highest percentage of funds provided by investors outside 
its home continent.  The reverse is true for disbursements of funds.  The Low-GDP group invests 
a higher percentage of funds domestically than both the High- and Mid-GDP groups.  Both the 
High- and Mid-GDP groups invest a higher percentage of funds in other countries in their home 
continents and outside the home continents. 
Table 3 reports the allocations of funds by stage and by industry.  Early stage includes 
seed and startup investments.  Later stage includes Mezzanine, buyout and turnaround for Asia.  
That for Europe includes replacement capital and buyout.  That for the US contains 
buyout/acquisition and other later stage firms funded by venture capital, which does not include 
funds raised specifically for buyouts and Mezzanine and other private equity.  High-Tech 
includes computer related, electronics, information technology, and telecommunications 
industries for Asia as defined by AVCJ.  That for Europe includes communications, computer 
related, and other electronic related industries as defined by EVCA.  That for US includes online  12 
specific, communications, computer software and services, semiconductor and other electronics 
and computer hardware industries as defined by NVCA.  Med-Tech includes medical, health 
related and biotechnology industries.  Non-Tech is the remaining industries excluding the High-
Tech and Med-Tech industries.   
Panel D, Table 3 shows that Asia tends to invest a higher percentage of funds at an early 
stage, while Europe invests a higher proportion at a later stage.  Europe tends to invest more in 
the medical and biotechnology industry than Asia.  The Low-GPD group allocates a significantly 
higher percentage of funds at the early stage than both the High- and Mid-GDP groups and in 
Non-Tech industry than the Mid-GDP group. Such results could be driven by the fact that Low-
GDP countries have less developed stock markets, which discourage later stage investments.  As 
Jeng and Wells (2000) have shown that IPOs have no effect on early stage investment but they 
are a significant factor that determines later stage investments.  In addition, Non-Tech industry is 
not as risky as High-Tech industry and does not require highly skilled workers, which may 
explain higher investments in the Non-Tech sector by the Low-GDP group.  The High-GDP 
group allocates a higher percentage of funds to the medical and biotechnology industry, followed 
by the Mid-GDP group, then by the Low-GDP group. 
The English legal origin group does not differ from the German and Scandinavian legal 
origin groups in early stage investment, but invests more in early stage than French legal origin 
group, which has the weakest legal protections of investors investing more in expansion stage 
than all others.   The Scandinavian legal origin group invests the highest percentage in the 
medical and biotechnology industry. 
 
4.  The Role of Corporate Governance  13 
4.1.  Links between law, financial development, and economic growth 
Because the direct governance structures between investors and venture capitalists and 
between venture capitalists and portfolio companies are not available, we resort to the analysis of 
the relationships between venture capitalism and governance to that between the level of venture 
capital activities and the extent of investor protection and contract enforcement across countries.  
The validity of this approach is supported by La Porta et al. (2000).  It contends that empirical 
evidence that links investor protection to more valuable stock markets, higher IPO rates (see, for 
example, La Porta et al. (1997)) and insider ownership of cash flows and corporate valuation 
(see, for example, Gorton and Schmid (2000)) reflecting strong investor protection is associated 
with effective corporate governance.  Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2000) and Wurgler 
(2000) also provide evidence of links between investor protection and efficient allocation of 
capital.  Therefore, in this study, we use investor protection and law enforcement to proxy the 
effectiveness of governance and examine its role on venture capital activities across countries.  
La Porta et al. (1998) provide various measures of investor protection and enforcement, 
such as, shareholder rights, creditor rights, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, 
accounting standards, etc.
6  However, among those, we find two variables, creditor rights and 
rule of law, have explanatory power on the levels of venture capital activities across countries.  
We discuss these two variables further next. 
Creditor rights is an index aggregating four measures indicating creditor protection, the 
index ranges from 0 to 4.  These four measures include “no automatic stay on assets,” “secured 
creditors first paid,” “restrictions for going into reorganization,” and “management does not stay 
in reorganization”.  Rule of law assesses the law and order tradition in the country.  The number 
ranges from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and order.  Both creditor rights 
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and rule of law information are obtained from La Porta et al. (1998) except for China, which is 
from Allen, Qian and Qian (2002). 
Besides the governance variables, we also control for the level of economic development, 
the past real economic growth, and the development of the stock market.
7  Dummy variables 
indicating if a country is in Asia and country’s legal origin are also included.  Economic growth, 
financial development, governance and investor protection are correlated as suggested by many 
empirical studies.
8   The proxy for the level of economic development is average real GDP per 
capita in 1995 US$ during 1991 to 2000.  Both continuous measure (Log of GDP per capita) and 
dummy variable specification that indicate high or middle level of GDP per capita are employed 
in the regressions.  Our findings are robust to both specifications, therefore, in most of the 
regressions, only one set of results is provided. 
Past real economic growth is a 4-year average GDP growth rate based on constant 1995 
US$ prior to the year that dependent variables are measured.  For example, where VCIP in 2000 
is the dependent variable, the 4-year average for economic growth covers 1996 to 1999.  The 
development of the stock market, i.e., the market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, is 
defined similarly.  The control of market capitalization is crucial during our sample period for 
several reasons.  First, it is documented that IPOs are an important exit method employed by 
venture capitalists (see Jeng and Wells (2000) and Black and Gilson (1998)).
9  A well-developed 
stock market implies a better channel of exit.  Secondly, the development of the stock market 
may indicate the country’s future economic condition and thus may signal an investment 
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8 See Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), Beck and Levine (2002), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). 
9 See Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990) and Lin and Smith (1998) for the role of venture capitalists 
during IPOs.  15 
opportunity to venture capitalists.  In addition, the development of a stock market in a country 
could be the result of integrated legal and governance structures as La Porta et al. (1997) suggest.  
Finally, Johnson et al. (2000) link the measures of corporate governance with the declines of 
stock markets in emerging countries during 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.  In aggregate, these 
reasons suggest that stock market development could affect venture capital investment in a 
country.  However, it also contains information overlapping with the measures of governance.  
These discussions indicate the complexity of interpretation of regression results. 
 
4.2.  Determinants of venture capital activities 
Table 4 reports the determinants of venture capital activities across countries.  VCIP 2000 
measures the cumulative venture capital investment as a percentage of GDP at the end of 2000.  
The results of Model (1) show that creditor rights are a significant determinant of the level of 
venture capital across countries rather than shareholder rights (not reported).  Venture capitalists 
tend to invest in counties with less tradition for law and order.  It can be argued these findings 
are consistent with the nature and role of venture capital.  Venture capital claims often more 
closely resemble creditor claims than equity claims.  Therefore, creditor protection is more 
important for venture capital activities.  The negative relation of VCIP with rule of law is 
perhaps more surprising.  What this suggests is that relationships are more important in many 
countries than contracts. As a result venture capital investments become more important in 
countries where the rule of law is less established.
10 
The level of economic development (measured by GDP per capita) is positively related to 
the level of venture capital investments.  Past real GDP growth does not affect the level of 
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specifications that drop each variable in turn.  The findings are more significant.  16 
venture capital investments but the size of market capitalization (as a % of GDP) does positively.  
As discussed above, the significant positive coefficient on market capitalization is consistent 
with several explanations.  It may indicate any one or all of the following, an easier channel for 
venture capital exit, a better economic outlook for the country, or a more developed financial 
infrastructure as a result of better investor protection aggregated from various governance 
measures.  The last explanation works in the direction of not finding significant results for 
governance measures. 
The German legal origin group, which includes bank centered Germany and Japan, has a 
lower level of venture capital activities compared to the English legal origin group.  As a 
robustness check, Model (2) uses a more continuous measure of economic development (Log of 
GDP per capita) than Model (1), which uses High-GDP and Mid-GDP dummy variables.  As 
Table 4 indicates, the results are robust.  Both new funds raised and total annul disbursements are 
the sums of 4 years (1997-2000) numbers measured as a percentage of GDP.  The findings are 
essentially the same as those of VCIP 2000.
11 
We further examine the allocations in different stages and in industries.  Although 
governance affects the level of venture capital activities, it does not influence the allocations to 
different stages of investments and industries except the medical and biotechnology industries as 
Table 5 shows.  Higher past real GDP growth encourages more early stage investment.  Larger 
market capitalization as a percentage of GDP encourages more later stage investment since the 
exit channel becomes more important for later stage.  Better creditor protection is associated with 
a higher percentage of funds allocated to the medical and biotechnology industry.  Higher GDP 
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started to show variation across countries since 1997.   17 
per capita and past real GDP growth are associated with higher allocation to High-Tech industry.  
The reverse is true for Non-Tech industry. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Venture capital is a special funding source that has fueled the development of many big 
companies in the technology sector in recent years both in the US and internationally.  In this 
paper, we examine the venture capital activities around the world in the 1990s and link such 
activities with corporate governance across countries.  We build upon the recent empirical 
evidence on the links among law and external public financing and extend the financing menu to 
private equity funding such as venture capital. 
Although the venture capital industry in the US started in 1946, this special funding 
source did not play a significant role in the economy until the 1980s, which is the decade many 
other countries started their venture capital industries or further developed the industries from 
their initial start.  However, the dramatic boom of this industry did not occur until the decade of 
the 1990s not only in US but also in Asia and in Europe, regardless of the level of GDP per 
capita, and legal origin.  All groups experienced impressive average growth rates above 20% 
while some are close to 40% during the period 1993 to 2000. 
The prosperity of the venture capital industry in the 1990s raises an empirical question, 
does the level and growth of venture capital investments in different countries depend on 
corporate governance?   Venture capital tends to invest in firms that are younger, more 
intangible, and riskier but have higher expected payoffs.  Such investment objectives demand 
financial contracting between venture capitalists and venture firms resort to equity or equity-
related claims but with the flavor and control of credit holders.  Our findings show that venture  18 
capitalists seeking to invest in countries with better creditor protection rather than shareholder 
protection, which is more relevant for publicly traded firms.  It highlights the main difference 
between private and public equity in terms of the natures of their claims. 
Despite the conventional wisdom that contracts play an important function in venture 
capital, we find a negative relation between the rule of law and venture capital.  This suggests 
relationships can substitute for contracts with this type of financing.  The findings contrast with 
those of La Porta et al. (1997) who find that the size of other funding sources, both debt and 
public equity, is larger in countries with more tradition of rule and order.  This indicates venture 
capital can substitute for debt and equity financing in the public markets.  Thus, we provide some 
evidence on the unique role of venture capital in the economy in contrast to other financing 
means. 
We do not find any links between governance and venture capital allocations except for 
the role of creditor rights in the medical and biotechnology industry.  It appears that governance 
matters for the level of venture capital activities across countries but does not affect allocations.  
Instead, fundamental economic conditions and the development of capital markets affect the 
industry and stage allocations, respectively. 
In the US venture capital is primarily associated with high technology industries.  Our 
findings indicate this is true in other countries that have high and medium GDP levels.  However, 
in Low-GDP countries venture capital is more often used for low tech industries.   
Finally, a comparison of the Asian and European venture capital industries indicates 
important differences.   In Asia there is more investment in early stage projects while in Europe 
there is more investment in late stage projects.  Also, in Europe there is more investment in 
medical and biotechnology industries.      19 
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Panel A. Asia 
Australia  1,268  2,650 11  0.37 0.58  7 21,159 
China  429  4,051  38 0.08  0.39 26 602 
Hong Kong, China  .  9,027  24  .  5.48  20  22,145 
India  111  1,618  47 0.04  0.35 38 388 
Indonesia  41 161 22 0.02  0.08 18 982 
Israel .  4,614  50  .  4.34  44  15,672 
Japan  7,359  11,420  6 0.14  0.20 5  42,776 
Malaysia  91 549 29 0.12  0.49 22  4,213 
New  Zealand  1  309 117 0.00 0.46 111  16,189 
Pakistan  0  11  122 0.00 0.02 115 494 
Philippines  30 221 33 0.04  0.25 28  1,100 
Singapore  859  4,484  27 1.24  3.95 18  23,392 
South  Korea  1,629  7,312  24 0.39  1.18 17  10,768 
Sri  Lanka  14 45 18  0.12  0.27  12  731 
Taiwan  505  3,525  32 0.22  1.29 29  11,893 
Thailand  80 447 28 0.06  0.26 24  2,652 
Panel B. Europe 
Austria  14 317 56 0.01  0.12 52  29,831 
Belgium  1,072  2,776  15 0.41  0.88 11  27,759 
Denmark  208 681 18 0.13  0.33 15  34,853 
Finland  100  1,045  40 0.08  0.63 33  26,813 
France  5,533  19,818  20 0.37  1.13 17  27,363 
Germany  4,313  15,132  20 0.18  0.56 17  30,406 
Greece .  309  96  .  0.22  90  11,665 
Ireland 263  630  13  0.46  0.60  4  19,972 
Italy  1,727  6,327  20 0.17  0.53 18  19,324 
Netherlands  1,811  7,420  22 0.46  1.51 18  27,635 
Norway  203 919 24 0.15  0.54 20  34,139 
Portugal  251  428 8 0.25  0.33 4  11,239 
Spain  661  2,784  23 0.12  0.40 19  15,491 
Sweden  545  4,843  37 0.24  1.75 32  27,785 
Switzerland  367  1,641  24 0.12  0.49 22  44,593 
United  Kingdom  10,787  33,078  17 1.03  2.56 14  19,489 
Panel C. America 
United  States  32,969  192,164  29 0.48  2.13 24  28,441 
Panel D. Average (Number of Observations) by Subgroup and t-test for Differences between Subgroup  
Asia 886.9  3152.7  39  0.2 1.2 33  10947.2 
 (14)  (16)  (16)  (14) (16) (16)  (16) 
Europe 1857.0  6134.3  28  0.3 0.8 24  25522.2 
 (15)  (16)  (16)  (15) (16) (16)  (16) 
Asia vs. European  -1.04  -1.22  1.10  -0.7 0.95 0.94  -3.88
*** 
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Panel D. Average (Number of Observations) by Subgroup and t-test for Differences between Subgroup 
High-GDP 4541.3  21514.6  26  0.2 0.9
  22  31866.1 
 (12)  (12)  (12)  (12) (12) (12)  (12) 
Mid-GDP 1795.1  5806.0  36  0.4 1.7 30  16799.8 
 (10)  (13)  (13)  (10) (13) (13)  (13) 
Low-GDP 99.4  887.7
   42  0.1 0.3
   36  1395.2 
 (8)  (8)  (8)  (8) (8) (8)  (8) 
High-GDP vs. Mid-GDP  0.89  1.03  -0.94  -1.53
a -1.51
a  -0.79  7.1
*** 
High-GDP vs. Low-GDP  1.34
a 1.07  -1.53
 a  2.95
*** 2.53
**  -1.27  13.77
*** 
Mid-GDP vs. Low-GDP  1.48
a 1.58
a  -0.43  2.54
** 2.22
**  -0.35  9.48
*** 
            
English legal origin  4222.1  19202.0  41  0.4 1.7 35  13456.7 
 (11)  (13)  (13)  (11) (13) (13)  (13) 
French legal origin  1390.6  4471.6  29  0.2 0.6 25  15838.8 
 (8)  (9)  (9)  (8) (9) (9)  (9) 
German legal origin  2364.68  6557.9  27  0.2 0.6 24  28377.7 
 (6)  (6)  (6)  (6) (6) (6)  (6) 
Scandinavian legal origin  264.2  1871.8  3  0.2 0.8 25  30897.4 
 (4)  (4)  (4)  (4) (4) (4)  (4) 
English vs. French  0.78  0.83  0.85  0.79 1.66
 a  0.7  -0.53 
English vs. German  0.44  0.58  0.88  0.99 1.3  0.7  -2.59
** 
English vs. Scandinavian  0.77  0.64  0.59  0.93 0.87 0.52  -3.27
*** 
French vs. German  -0.77  -0.64  0.15  0.64 -0.19  0.1  -1.94
* 
French vs. Scandinavian  1.21  0.78  -0.07  0.88 -0.69 -0.01  -2.69
*** 
German vs. Scandinavian  1.41
a 1.52
a  -0.29  0.36 -0.48 -0.15  -0.33 
 
Venture capital investment portfolio (VCIP) for Asian countries is the cumulative total of existing 
investments less any divestments made as defined by Asian Venture Capital Journal.  That for European 
countries is the “Portfolio at Cost” on December 31 reported by European Private Equity & Venture 
Capital Association.  National Venture Capital Association does not report VCIP, thus, “Capital Under 
Management” is used as the proxy for VCIP for the United States.  The unit for the first two columns is 
millions in constant 1995 US$.  “%CAGR” is the geometric annual growth rate in percentage for VCIP in 
real US dollar and in % of GDP over 1993-2000.  The number of observations for growth rate calculation 
is 7 except those for Hong Kong, Israel, and Greece, which are 4, 3 and 5, respectively.  GDPPC is 
average GDP per capita during 1991-2000 in constant 1995 US$.  High-GDP group contains countries 
having average GDP per capita greater than or equal to US$25,000.  Mid-GDP group includes countries 
having average GDP per capita less than US$25,000 and greater than or equal to US$10,000.  Low-GDP 
group includes those with GDP per capita less than US$10,000.  Legal origin identifies the country’s 
Company Law or Commercial Code origin as classified by La Porta et al. (1998).  There is no legal origin 
classification for China.  
a Significant at the 10 percent level for a one-tailed test.  
*, 
**,
 ***, Significant at 
the 10, 5, 1 percent level for a two-tailed test. 
  23 
Table 2 Venture Capital Funds Sources and Disbursements in 2000 by Region and by Country 
 



















Panel A. Asia 
Australia  0.28  0.17  81  96 4  2 15 2 
China  0.19  0.08  56 81 17 17 27  2 
Hong  Kong  1.94  1.49  9  13 20 84 71  3 
India  0.26  0.19  10  92  21 5 69 3 
Indonesia  0.00  0.02  52  100  14 0 34 0 
Israel  3.41  2.77  72  89 2  0 26  11 
Japan  0.10  0.05  76  82 4  7 20  11 
Malaysia  0.19  0.12  46 89 26 10 28  1 
New  Zealand  0.30  0.20  90 89 10 11  0  0 
Pakistan 0.01  0.01  87  100  0  0  13  0 
Philippines  0.12  0.11  35 86 22 13 43  1 
Singapore  1.98  1.40  30 16 31 67 39 17 
South  Korea  0.43  0.60  68  94 8  3 24 3 
Sri Lanka  0.04  0.07  62  100  8  0  30  0 
Taiwan  0.52  0.37  82  78 6  9 12  13 
Thailand  0.25  0.07  23  91  15 8 62 1 
Panel B. Europe 
Austria  0.11  0.08  92  88 9 12 0  0 
Belgium  0.26  0.23  100  56 0 15 0 30 
Denmark  0.40  0.16  99  69 1 23 0  8 
Finland  0.42  0.29  83 70 14 25  4  5 
France  0.44  0.38  58  88  22 7 21 4 
Germany 0.30  0.23  79  82  11  9  9  9 
Greece  0.25  0.16  66  31 3 64  31 5 
Ireland  0.19  0.22  83 78 11 22  6  0 
Italy  0.24  0.25  47 77 40 13 13 10 
Netherlands  0.67  0.48  53 51 35 37 12 12 
Norway  0.23  0.17  100  87  0 8 0 5 
Portugal  0.08  0.16  100  93  0 7 0 0 
Spain  0.32  0.19  57  97  31 2 12 1 
Sweden  1.27  0.93  35 60 40 40 25  0 
Switzerland  0.25  0.24  76  25 6 69  18 6 
United  Kingdom  1.12  0.86  37 69 17 24 46  8 
Panel C. America 
United  States  0.94  1.05  - - - - - - 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 



















Panel D. Average (Number of Observations) by Subgroup and t-test for Differences between Subgroup 
Asian  (n=16)  0.6  0.5  55 81 13 15 32  4 
Europe  (n=16)  0.4  0.3  73 70 15 24 12  6 
Asia vs. European  0.86  0.83  -2.03
* 1.3 -0.43  -1.12  3.22
*** -0.97 
            
High-GDP  (n=12)  0.4  0.4  77 69 13 23 10  8 
Mid-GDP  (n=13)  0.9  0.7  63 71 14 24 23  6 
Low-GDP  (n=8)  0.1  0.1  46  92  15 7 38 1 
High-GDP vs. Mid-GDP  -1.31  -1.33
a 1.43
a -0.16 -0.24 -0.08 -1.91
* 0.91 
















            
English legal origin (n=13)  0.8  0.7  52  77  14  19  34  4 
French legal origin (n=9)  0.3  0.2  63  75  18  18  18  7 
German legal origin (n=6)  0.3  0.3  79  75  7  18  14  7 
Scandinavian legal origin 
(n=4)  0.6  0.4  79 71 14 24  7  5 
English vs. French  1.64
a 1.58
a  -0.88 0.12 -0.87 0.17 1.68
a -0.99 




English vs. Scandinavian  0.48  0.63  -1.52
a 0.34 -0.03 -0.32 2.08
** -0.25 
French vs. German  -0.2  -0.48  -1.64
a 0.04 1.77
a -0.05 0.68  0.01 
French vs. Scandinavian  -1.75
a -1.22  -1.07  0.3  0.51  -0.57  1.3  0.5 
German vs. Scandinavian  -1.44
a  -0.69  -0.02 0.25 -0.84 -0.42  1.0  0.87 
 
New funds raised (total annual disbursements) are total capital raised (invested) during 2000 as a 
percentage of GDP.  For Asian and European countries, the numbers include both venture capital and 
buyouts.  For the US, only venture capital is included.  Same region indicates the percentage of funds 
raised (sources) or disbursements (uses) in the same continent.  Outside region indicates region outside 
the home continent.  The last 6 columns (% sources and uses) do not contain US data because, by the 
definition of NVCA, it only provides US domestic activities.  Thus, we do not have information on 
foreign funding sources and investment for US.  The numbers of observations for the means of High-GDP 
and English legal origin groups are 11 and 12, respectively.  High-GDP group contains countries having 
average GDP per capita during 1991-2000 greater than or equal to US$25,000.  Mid-GDP group includes 
countries having average GDP per capita less than US$25,000 and greater than or equal to US$10,000.  
Low-GDP group includes those with GDP per capita less than US$10,000.  Legal origin identifies the 
country’s Company Law or Commercial Code origin as classified by La Porta et al (1998).  There is no 
legal origin classification for China.  




Significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level for a two-tailed test. 
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Table 3 Venture Capital Disbursements in 2000 by Stage and by Industry  
 
  % by Stage  % by Industry 
Country Early  Expansion  Later  High-tech  Med-tech  Non-tech 
Panel A. Asia 
Australia  16 53 31 26  7  67 
China  43 43 14 30  7  63 
Hong  Kong  26 35 39 37  6  57 
India  49  42 9 53 6 42 
Indonesia  9 63  28  39 3 58 
Israel  51 36 13 66  9  25 
Japan  19 44 37 36  2  63 
Malaysia  30 48 22 47  3  50 
New  Zealand  29 57 14 50  8  43 
Pakistan  80  20 0 17 3 80 
Philippines  19 63 18 44  0  56 
Singapore  30 44 26 53  9  38 
South  Korea  28 38 34 41  1  57 
Sri  Lanka  53 37 10 33  2  66 
Taiwan  33 42 25 65  6  30 
Thailand  17 48 35 31  3  67 
Panel B. Europe 
Austria  37  54 9 43 8 49 
Belgium  47  46 7 47 9 43 
Denmark  13 46 41 26 29 45 
Finland  35 29 36 39 17 44 
France  22 36 43 44  6  50 
Germany  35 45 20 37 16 47 
Greece  5 57  39  60 0 40 
Ireland  50  45 5 81 6 13 
Italy  18 33 49 28  3  69 
Netherlands  19 55 26 32  6  62 
Norway  35  63 2 43 5 53 
Portugal  17 57 26 34  1  66 
Spain  18 51 32 29  6  65 
Sweden  10 15 76 19  8  73 
Switzerland  9 20  71  16 5 79 
United  Kingdom  12 34 54 23 15 62 
Panel C. America 
United  States  23 54 23 85  7  8 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
  % by Stage  % by Industry 
Subgroup Early  Expansion  Later  High-Tech  Med-Tech  Non-Tech 
Panel D. Average (Number of Observations) by Subgroup and t-test for Differences between Subgroup 
Asian  (n=16)  33 45 22 42  5  54 
Europe  (n=16)  24 43 33 38  9  54 
Asia vs. European  1.65
a 0.41 -1.8
* 0.77  -2.04
** -0.01 
        
High-GDP  (n=12)  25 42 33 39 10 51 
Mid-GDP  (n=13)  26 45 30 46  6  48 
Low-GDP  (n=8)  38 46 17 37  3  60 
High-GDP vs. Mid-GDP  -0.05  -0.5  0.36  -0.94  1.62
a 0.4 









        
English legal origin (n=13)  36  43  22  46  6  47 
French legal origin (n=9)  19  51  30  40  4  56 
German  legal  origin(n=6)  27 41 33 40  6  54 
Scandinavian  legal  origin  (n=4)  23 38 39 31 15 54 
English vs. French  2.28
** -1.85
** -1.31  0.84  1.81
** -1.16 
English vs. German  1.06  0.39  -1.3  0.68  0.08  -0.67 
English vs. Scandinavian  1.2  0.57  -1.54
a 1.31 -2.46
** -0.56 
French vs. German  -1.27  1.78
**  -0.34 0.03 -1.16 0.34 
French vs. Scandinavian  -0.54  1.46
a -0.76 1.34 -2.88
** 0.39 
German vs. Scandinavian  0.46  0.22  -0.36  0.89  -1.65
a 0.03 
 
Early stage includes seed and startup investments.  Later stage includes Mezzanine, buyout and 
turnaround for Asia.  That for Europe includes replacement capital and buyout.  That for the US contains 
buyout/acquisition and other later stage funded by venture capital, which does not include funds raised 
specifically for buyouts, Mezzanine and other private equity.  High-Tech includes computer related, 
electronics, information technology, and telecommunications industries for Asia as defined by AVCJ.  
That for Europe includes communications, computer related, and other electronic related industries as 
defined by EVCA.  That for US includes online specific, communications, computer software and 
services, semiconductor and other electronics and computer hardware industries as defined by NVCA.  
Med-Tech includes medical, health related and biotechnology industries.  Non-Tech is the remaining 
industries excluding the High-Tech and Med-Tech.  High-GDP group contains countries having average 
GDP per capita during 1991-2000 greater than or equal to US$25,000.  Mid-GDP group includes 
countries having average GDP per capita less than US$25,000 and greater than or equal to US$10,000.  
Low-GDP group includes those with GDP per capita less than US$10,000.  Legal origin identifies the 
country’s Company Law or Commercial Code origin as classified by La Porta et al. (1998).  There is no 
legal origin classification for China.  




Significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level for a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4 Determinants of the Level of Venture Capital Activities across Countries 
 
 
VCIP in 2000 
(1) 






Independent Variable  Estimate  t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 










High-GDP (indicator variable)  4.14  5.37
*** -  -  7.18  5.31
*** 4.96 6.15
*** 
Mid-GDP (indicator variable)  3.12  6.15
*** -  -  5.60  6.45
*** 3.70 7.15
*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)  -  -  0.98  4.28
***  - - - - 
Lag  real  GDP  growth  0.03 0.35 0.10 1.21 0.12 1.09 0.12 1.76
* 
Lag market 





Asia (indicator variable)  0.91  2.31
***  0.59 1.32 0.66 0.96 0.21 0.51 
French origin (indicator 
variable)  -0.30 -0.71 -0.04 -0.08 -0.48 -0.78 -0.35 -0.97 
German origin (indicator 





Scandinavian origin (indicator 
variable)  -0.70 -1.40 -0.34 -0.61 -0.56 -0.68 -0.70 -1.44 
Intercept -0.69  -0.70  -7.41  -4.06
***  -0.77 -0.58 -0.05 -0.07 
           
Adjusted R
2  0.74  0.62  0.71  0.70  
Number of Observations  33    33  33  33  
 
Venture capital investment portfolio (VCIP) for Asian countries is the cumulative total of existing 
investments less any divestments made as defined by Asian Venture Capital Journal.  That for European 
countries is the “Portfolio at Cost” on December 31 reported by European Private Equity & Venture 
Capital Association.  National Venture Capital Association does not report VCIP, thus, “Capital Under 
Management” is used as the proxy for VCIP for United States.  The number is standardized by GDP.  
New funds raised (Total annual disbursements) are total capital raised (invested) from 1997 to 2000 as 
percentage of GDP.  For Asian and European countries, the numbers include both venture capital and 
buyouts.  For US, only venture capital is included.  High-GDP group contains countries having average 
GDP per capita during 1991-2000 greater than or equal to US$25,000.  Mid-GDP group includes 
countries having average GDP per capita less than US$25,000 and greater than or equal to US$10,000.  
Low-GDP group includes those with GDP per capita less than US$10,000.  Creditor rights is an index 
aggregating four measures indicating creditor protection, the index ranges from 0 to 4.  Rule of law 
assesses the law and order tradition in the country.  The number ranges from 0 to 10, with lower scores 
for less tradition for law and order.  Both creditor rights and rule of law information are obtained from La 
Porta et al. (1998) except China, which is from Allen, Qian and Qian (2002).  Legal origin identifies the 
country’s Company Law or Commercial Code origin as classified by La Porta et al. (1998).  There is no 
legal origin classification for China.  Lag variables are 4-year average prior to the dependent variables’ 
time period.  
*, 
**,
 ***, Significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level for a two-tailed test. 
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Table 5 Determinants of Venture Capital Stage and Industry Disbursements across Countries  
 
  Disbursement by Stage  Disbursement by Industry 
 Early  Expansion  Later  High-Tech  Med-Tech  Non-Tech 
Independent Variable  Estimate  t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Creditor  rights  3.16 1.23 0.03 0.01 -3.20  -1.13  -0.52  -0.18 1.79 2.00
* -1.27 -0.42 
Rule  of  law  -1.27  -0.58 2.57 1.32 -1.31  -0.54  -2.52  -0.99 0.63 0.83 1.89 0.73 
Ln(GDP  per  capita)  -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.04 0.31  0.07  8.84 1.96
* 0.27 0.20 -9.10  -1.97
* 
Lag real GDP growth  2.70  1.87
* 0.58 0.46 -3.28  -2.08
** 3.66 2.20






*** -0.04  -0.77  -0.01  -0.43  0.05  0.88 
Asia (indicator variable)  -5.50  -0.73  10.00  1.50  -4.50  -0.55  3.41  0.39  -3.09  -1.18  -0.31  -0.04 
French origin (indicator 
variable)  -12.87  -1.50  11.45 1.51 1.38 0.15 -2.97 -0.30 -2.15 -0.72 5.12 0.51 
German origin (indicator 
variable)  -2.92 -0.37 -3.50 -0.50 6.43  0.74 -7.96 -0.87 -1.09 -0.40 9.05  0.97 
Scandinavian origin 
(indicator variable)  -8.39 -0.89 -4.54 -0.54 12.97 1.25 -15.66  -1.43 5.25  1.60 10.41 0.93 
Intercept  37.39 1.20 22.40 0.81 40.18 1.18 -27.02  -0.75 -3.61 -0.33  130.63  3.56
*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.31  0.04  0.32   0.1   0.33   0.1   
Number of Observations  33    33  33  33  33  33  
 
The dependent variable is the percentage of funding allocated to each corresponding category.  Early stage includes seed and startup investments.  
Later stage includes Mezzanine, buyout and turnaround for Asia.  That for Europe includes replacement capital and buyout.  That for the US 
contains buyout/acquisition and other later stage funded by venture capital, which does not include funds raised specifically for buyouts and 
Mezzanine and other private equity.  High-Tech includes computer related, electronics, information technology, and telecommunications 
industries for Asia as defined by AVCJ.  That for Europe includes communications, computer related, and other electronic related industries as 
defined by EVCA.  That for the US includes online specific, communications, computer software and services, semiconductor and other 
electronics and computer hardware industries as defined by NVCA.  Med-Tech includes medical, health related and biotechnology industries.  
Non-Tech is the remaining industries excluding the High-Tech and Med-Tech.  Creditor rights is an index aggregating four measures indicating 
creditor protection, the index ranges from 0 to 4.  Rule of law assesses the law and order tradition in the country.  The number ranges from 0 to 10, 
with lower scores for less tradition for law and order.  Both creditor rights and rule of law information are obtained from La Porta et al. (1998) 
except China, which is from Allen, Qian and Qian (2002).  Legal origin identifies the country’s Company Law or Commercial Code origin as 
classified by La Porta et al. (1998).  There is no legal origin classification for China.  Lag variables are 4-year average prior to the dependent 
variables’ time period.  
*, 
**,
 ***, Significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level for a two-tailed test. 
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